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THE CISG AND THE GOOD FAITH PRINCIPLE 
Nina Tepeš* and Hrvoje Markovinović** 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Article 7(1) of the United States Convention on Contracts for the 
International Sale of Goods (hereinafter “CISG”) contains an interpretative 
rule, providing that “[i]n the interpretation of the [CISG], regard is to be had 
to its international character and to the need to promote uniformity in its 
application and the observance of good faith in international trade.”1 
Although thirty years of its application ensured that its parts relating to the 
“international character” and “uniformity in . . . application” are generally 
considered to be uncontroversial, both legal theory and practice still seem to 
be far from reaching consensus on the meaning and application of “good faith 
in international trade.” 
The origins of the ongoing “good faith” contention are well-established. 
Reference to “good faith” was introduced in Art. 7(1) of the CISG because 
of the compromise between representatives of civil law countries (which 
argued in favor of wide acceptance of the good faith principle and its direct 
application to parties’ conduct in terms of formation and/or execution of the 
sales contract) and representatives of common law countries (which argued 
for quite the opposite outcome, i.e., that reference to the good faith principle 
be deleted altogether).2 It seems that the fact that reference to “good faith” 
                                                                                                                           
 
* Nina Tepeš is a professor at Faculty of Law, University of Zagreb. 
** Hrvoje Markovinović is an associate professor at Faculty of Law, University of Zagreb. 
1 U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International 
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2 UN CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS (CISG): A 
COMMENTARY 121 (Stefan Kröll et al., eds. 2d ed. 2018) [hereinafter CISG: A COMMENTARY]. 
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found its way into the CISG, albeit in a separate provision concerning 
interpretation, provided both scholars and practitioners with solid ground to 
continue their original debate. Although divergent opinions pertaining to the 
“good faith principle” represent a serious problem in terms of CISG’s 
uniform application, this paper does not deal with the issue of whether the 
principle should be directly applied to the sales contract or merely used in 
the interpretative process. The reasons for such an approach are twofold. 
Firstly, the authors of this paper (although both from civil law countries) 
are strong advocates of the narrow approach according to which the good 
faith principle must be applied only to the interpretation of the CISG. In the 
process of interpreting the interpretative provision, one can simply not 
overlook the fact that Art. 7(1) defines its own scope of application by stating 
that it applies “in the interpretation of the CISG.” Although this analysis 
might seem (overly) simplistic, its premise is essentially based upon a well-
established rule according to which an individual provision of a legal 
instrument must (to the extent possible) be understood according to the clear 
meaning of the words considered in its text. And there is simply nothing 
doubtful about the wording of Art. 7(1) of the CISG. We therefore must reject 
the argument that “[t]he placement of the good faith principle in the context 
of an operative provision dealing with the interpretation of the CISG creates 
uncertainties as to the principle’s exact nature, scope, and function within the 
CISG.”3 The placement of the principle is not per se a source of confusion, 
but rather a clear indication that it was intended to serve only for 
interpretative purposes. As will be explained later in the paper, the 
interpretative role assigned to the good faith principle represents an 
unorthodox solution with potentially unfortunate consequences. However, 
this must not be used as justification to apply Art. 7(1) CISG contra legem.4 
To neglect the clear wording of Art. 7(1) of the CISG and argue that 
                                                                                                                           
 
3 INST. OF INT’L COMMERCIAL LAW OF THE PACE UNIV. SCHOOL OF LAW, AN INTERNATIONAL 
APPROACH TO THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF 
GOODS (1980) AS UNIFORM SALES LAW 12 (John Felemegas ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 2007), 
http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/felemegas14.html#iv; see also Lorena Carvajal-Arenas & A.F.M. 
Maniruzzaman, Cooperation as Philosophical Foundation of Good Faith in International Business-
Contracting—A View Through the Prism of Transnational Law (2012), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2000932 (“[Art. 7(1) of the CISG is] ambiguous because it is the result of a 
formal commitment between countries which wanted a general norm about good faith and those that did 
not accept such a norm.”). 
4 See Michael Bridge, Good Faith, the Common Law, and the CISG, 22 UNIFORM L. REV. 1, 109 
(2017). 
2019]  THE CISG AND THE GOOD FAITH PRINCIPLE 13 
 
Vol. 38 (2019-2020) ● ISSN: 2164-7984 (online) ● ISSN 0733-2491 (print)  
DOI 10.5195/jlc.2020.172 ● http://jlc.law.pitt.edu 
contractual parties have a general obligation to act in accordance with good 
faith is tantamount to inventing an entirely new substantive rule which is 
(arguably) applied in addition to Art. 7(1) of the CISG. The fact that the 
legislative history also speaks in support of our conclusion only adds to our 
resolve that the extensive application of the “good faith principle” to the 
contractual relationship must be abandoned as erroneous. 
Secondly, it is often overlooked that every debate on application of good 
faith principle should start by recognizing that one must first determine its 
substantive meaning. Our analysis of scholarly writings and jurisprudence 
indicates that the fundamental question of what exactly constitutes “good 
faith in international trade” is rarely dealt with in a satisfactory manner. 
Proposed definitions often represent nothing more than a set of diverse, 
unprecise and ultimately impractical generalizations with an overall result of 
adding to legal uncertainty. In addition, this seems to apply irrespective of 
the scope of application of the good faith principle advocated for. 
Without an ambition to provide for its definitive meaning, our primary 
focus in this paper will be on determining the appropriate frame of reference 
for the application of the good faith principle in the interpretative process 
envisaged by Art. 7(1) of the CISG. As will be shown, such an approach will 
hopefully provide an interpreter (either judge or arbitrator) with guidance as 
to the methodology that needs to be employed in the process of applying Art. 
7(1) of the CISG, thus adding to legal certainty and (even if only indirectly) 
helping the process of determining substantive boundaries of the principle of 
good faith with the CISG. 
II. THE LASTING EFFECTS OF AN UNFORTUNATE COMPROMISE 
It seems wrong to insist that the problem surrounding application of 
good faith in the CISG is the exclusive result of the fact that it has different 
meanings and functions in different countries (the difference being most 
notable once compared along the lines dividing civil and common law legal 
systems). If nothing else, the fact that legal terms have intrinsically distinct 
meanings in various jurisdictions (including jurisdictions that form part of 
the same legal family) is the problem that the CISG drafters were facing, 
because such was the very nature of their endeavor. Finding solutions 
acceptable to delegates coming from different legal backgrounds was the 
very essence of their ambitious task to write a uniform set of rules applicable 
to international sales transactions. The success of the CISG as an 
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international legal instrument is thus often correctly attributed to drafters’ 
extraordinary ability to agree on a number of compromise solutions which, 
in turn, ensured that the overall result was acceptable to an unprecedented 
number of states. 
As previously mentioned, one such compromise was reached regarding 
the principle of good faith. Considering that delegates were rightly concerned 
with the legal uncertainty stemming from the inherent vagueness of the 
principle of good faith,5 one might expect that the search for a workable 
compromise would be focused on finding an acceptable substantive 
definition of the principle. However, legislative history clearly shows that 
delegates’ efforts had little to do with defining the good faith principle itself. 
Quite to the contrary, the debate was mainly focused on finding a solution 
that would somehow reconcile two (ultimately irreconcilable) legal 
traditions—civil law tradition, which generally recognizes good faith as an 
independent legal principle, and common law tradition, which (although it 
uses various other legal tools to reach functionally comparable results) 
declines to adopt the general principle of good faith. 
At this point, it helps to remember that the first proposal to introduce 
good faith had nothing to do with the interpretation of CISG’s provisions. 
More specifically, it provided that “in the course of the formation of the 
contract the parties must observe the principles of fair dealing and act in good 
faith.”6 At the 1980 Vienna Conference, delegates from Italy proposed an 
alternative solution, providing that “in the formation [interpretation] and 
performance of a contract of sale the parties shall observe the principles of 
good faith and international co-operation.”7 In order to properly analyze these 
proposals, they must be considered by taking into account the function that 
                                                                                                                           
 
5 See UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION ON INT’L TRADE LAW, A/CN.9/142/Add.1—REPORT OF THE 
WORKING GROUP ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS ON THE WORK OF ITS NINTH SESSION 
(GENEVA, 19–30 SEPTEMBER 1977) 67 (Volume IX 1978); see also UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION ON 
INT’L TRADE LAW, A/CN.9/146/ADD. 1-4 ANALYTICAL COMPILATION OF COMMENTS BY 
GOVERNMENTS AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS ON THE DRAFT CONVENTION ON THE FORMATION 
OF CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS AS ADOPTED BY THE WORKING GROUP ON THE 
INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS AND ON THE DRAFT OF A UNIFORM LAW FOR THE UNIFICATION OF 
CERTAIN RULES RELATING TO VALIDITY OF CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS 
PREPARED BY THE INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR THE UNIFICATION OF PRIVATE LAW 132–33 (Volume 
IX 1978) (critiquing insertion of good faith principle into the CISG during the drafting process). 
6 See Pre-Contract Formation (2008), https://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/kritzer1.html 
#leg. 
7 Id. 
2019]  THE CISG AND THE GOOD FAITH PRINCIPLE 15 
 
Vol. 38 (2019-2020) ● ISSN: 2164-7984 (online) ● ISSN 0733-2491 (print)  
DOI 10.5195/jlc.2020.172 ● http://jlc.law.pitt.edu 
the good faith principle has in those legal systems that recognize it as a 
general principle of law. At the very minimum, this represents the only 
applicable frame of reference as the comparison with the legal systems that 
do not recognize the general duty to act in good faith is impractical (if not 
entirely impossible). 
Irrespective of the substantive meaning that may be attributed to it in 
various domestic laws, the good faith principle (when recognized as a general 
principle of law) essentially represents a standard of parties’ behavior. In 
other words, by prescribing a general duty to act in good faith, a (national) 
legislator ensures that parties are discharging of their rights and obligations 
in a manner which is considered appropriate within the specific legal system. 
An obligation to conform to the standard of behavior in line with good faith 
is prescribed by means of a general, open-ended legal norm, as it is 
considered impossible (and counterproductive) to predict all situations and 
potential behaviors that could theoretically represent its violation. In 
addition, since determination of what constitutes an appropriate behavior in 
contractual transactions inevitably reflects (for lack of a better word) “moral 
values” of a specific legal system, the use of a general norm enables that the 
principle is (if need be) adaptable to various societal changes. However, the 
reference to moral values must not be equated with the subjective perception 
of morality reflecting either judges’ or parties’ personal views. The principle 
of good faith is an objective concept which must always be determined by 
reference to categories of behavior recognized as acceptable by the legal 
order. This is the reason why the ultimate concretization of the principle is 
primarily the task of jurisprudence and legal theory, which substantiate its 
meaning by outlining boundaries that must be respected by parties involved 
in contractual transactions.8 
It is against these lines that one must test the “success” of the 
compromise as reflected in Art. 7(1) of the CISG. More specifically, by 
providing that good faith is one (of the three) interpretative criteria, and not 
a standard of behavior, drafters effectively distorted the meaning it has in the 
legal systems that historically recognize its role in the domain of contract 
law. At the same time, their refusal to provide for an express obligation of 
the contractual parties to act in good faith represented only pyrrhic victory 
                                                                                                                           
 
8 See M. Baretić, Načelo savjesnosti i poštenja u obveznom pravu [The Principle of Consciousness 
and Honesty (Good Faith) in Obligations], 24 ZB. PRAV. FAK. SVEUC. RIJ. [Z.P.F.R.] 571 (1991) (Croatia) 
(comprehensively analyzing the good faith principle and its importance). 
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for the delegates that advocated for deletion of good faith from the CISG. 
After all, if CISG provisions must be interpreted in line with good faith, does 
that not mean that parties to the sales contract (observant of their rights and 
obligations prescribed by the CISG) must also conform their behavior to the 
same standard? At the same time, what does it mean to interpret CISG’s 
provisions in line with good faith if the CISG itself does not provide for a 
general duty of the parties to act in good faith? 
Although the inexplicable circularity of the existing solution certainly 
set a stage for debates on the role of good faith in the CISG, one conclusion 
that can undoubtedly be drawn from our analysis is that the interpretative 
process, which relies on the observance of good faith, will not come naturally 
to judges and arbitrators from either civil or common law backgrounds. 
However, to find a workable solution (under the assumption that such a 
solution exists in the first place), one must take step back and analyze the 
good faith principle within the intended dimension of an interpretative rule 
of Art. 7 of the CISG. 
The need to interpret a legal instrument must start with the presumption 
that its provision(s) are in an actual need of interpretation. This would 
generally (and quite logically) imply that the proper meaning of a certain 
provision cannot be inferred from the text, as the wording is either doubtful 
or obscure. In other words, although the normative appeal to adhere to the 
good faith principle is quite understandable (especially if the principle is 
understood broadly in terms of drafters’ aspiration to create equitable rules 
which promote justice and fairness),9 one must be careful not to indulge in 
an overly extensive exercise of interpretation. The subtle task of the 
interpreter is to shed much-needed light on the meaning of the provision 
while simultaneously considering the paramount purpose and relevant 
circumstances on which the provision is based. Although judges (interpreting 
their national codes) employ interpretation techniques which may lead to the 
creation of new legal rules, it seems that such an endeavor should be used 
restrictively within the realm of the CISG. As already mentioned, the success 
of the CISG as an international instrument largely rests on the fact that its 
provisions represent compromise solutions which were deemed acceptable 
                                                                                                                           
 
9 See Disa Sim, The Scope and Application of Good Faith in the Vienna Convention on Contracts 
for the International Sale of Goods (2001), http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/sim1.html#iiia 
(warning about the “normative appeal of the concept of good faith” and dangers of applying it within 
CISG unless the doctrine proves to be a coherent one). 
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to delegates coming from various legal traditions. Consequently, 
interpretation which uncritically broadens the scope of the CISG by inventing 
new rights and obligations which were never contemplated by the drafters 
(or, even worse, which were deliberately expunged from the CISG because 
they were too controversial and perilous for the success of the entire 
unification process) must never be utilized. Leaving aside the distinct 
problems stemming from application of Art. 7(2) of the CISG,10 it follows 
that the interpretation mandated by Art. 7(1) of the CISG should apply only 
to provisions that are considered ambiguous (dubious or incomplete). This 
should primarily include instances where drafters left certain aspect(s) of the 
provision deliberately open because they were unable to reach a consensus 
but nevertheless wanted to retain the specific rule within the CISG. 
Turning back to Art. 7(1) of the CISG, the next step should (quite 
logically) be to determine the substantive meaning of the good faith principle. 
After all, if certain provisions of the CISG must be interpreted by reference 
to the good faith principle, the interpreter surely must know the meaning of 
such an interpretative criterion. 
Although application of good faith in the CISG still receives a lot of 
attention in scholarly writings, the majority of authors do not define the 
principle at all or, alternatively, use broad wording which lacks any 
substantive meaning. Judicial and arbitral practice unfortunately follows the 
same pattern as the available jurisprudence shows absence of a convincing 
reasoning which could persuasively justify application of good faith.11 It 
seems like the self-fulfilling prophecy voiced during the drafting process by 
delegates who warned that the term is too vague and imprecise is now 
threatening to render Art. 7(1) of the CISG—or better to say its part relating 
to good faith—effectively inoperable. 
However, this should hardly come as a surprise. As previously 
mentioned, the good faith principle primarily represents a standard of 
behavior which ensures that specific rights and obligations of parties 
involved in a transaction are discharged in accordance with the fundamental 
                                                                                                                           
 
10 As our primary focus was on Art. 7(1) CISG and analysis of good faith principle as an 
interpretative criterion, application of Art. 7(2) CISG and the discussion on whether good faith is a general 
principle on which the CISG is based is not analyzed in this paper. 
11 See Benedict Sheehy, Good Faith in the CISG: The Interpretation Problems of Article 7, in 
REVIEW OF THE CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS (CISG) 153–96 
(PACE INT’L L. REV. eds. 2004), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=777105. 
18 JOURNAL OF LAW AND COMMERCE [Vol. 38:11 
 
Vol. 38 (2019-2020) ● ISSN: 2164-7984 (online) ● ISSN 0733-2491 (print)  
DOI 10.5195/jlc.2020.172 ● http://jlc.law.pitt.edu 
values of a specific legal system. If we ignore the obvious impracticality (if 
not absurdity) of applying a standard of behavior as an interpretative criterion 
and advance the argument by recognizing that good faith cannot be 
determined by reference to the values existing in domestic law, we are faced 
with the problem of not having a workable frame of reference. 
Although one may be tempted to argue that the interpreter will, arguably 
by means of its own intuition, know the meaning of the good faith principle—
it must be stressed that the process of substantively defining the good faith 
principle is as susceptible to the so-called homeward trend as any other term 
of the CISG. Before analysis of the plausible meaning of good faith within 
the CISG, it seems appropriate to briefly outline the potential dangers of an 
argument that the good faith principle needs no substantive definition as it 
apparently rests “in the eyes of the beholder.” 
Discussion on the substantive meaning of good faith often mandates that 
the principle must be viewed through the lens of moral and/or ethical values. 
To that extent, it has been pointed out that the “observance of good faith in 
international trade ought to be considered a moral or ethical standard to be 
followed by businesspersons, projecting fundamental ethical values in 
international sales contracts.”12 Although the appeal of moral and/or ethical 
standards is quite understandable (at least inasmuch as the terms are used 
interchangeably to denote equally elusive reference to justice and fairness), 
it is clear that such an approach, once introduced in the arena of international 
commercial transactions, becomes entirely unhelpful as it rests on 
undeterminable set of variables. It seems that an attempt to define one 
concept by way of introducing another one which is at least as vague as the 
one which it is supposed to define, ultimately rests on the premise that we 
will all unmistakably know what the good faith is once we see it. However, 
that argument is just another side of the same coin which defines good faith 
as essentially nothing more than the lack of bad faith (which we are, arguably, 
also able to detect instinctively).13 Potential circularity of the argument, 
resting on the reasoning that the party acts in good faith if its behavior does 
not constitute bad faith, and vice versa, provides little guidance for 
constructive legal analysis. Even when faced with an attempt to define good 
faith by focusing on the perceived ethical values of a definite group (i.e. 
                                                                                                                           
 
12 See CISG: A COMMENTARY, supra note 2, at 121. 
13 See Bruno Zeller, The Observance of Good Faith in International Trade, in CISG 
METHODOLOGY 144 (Andre Janssen & Olaf Meyer eds., 2009). 
2019]  THE CISG AND THE GOOD FAITH PRINCIPLE 19 
 
Vol. 38 (2019-2020) ● ISSN: 2164-7984 (online) ● ISSN 0733-2491 (print)  
DOI 10.5195/jlc.2020.172 ● http://jlc.law.pitt.edu 
businesspersons), the proposition is flawed unless the interpreter is provided 
with methodology for establishing the specific “values” that will facilitate 
the process of extracting the fundaments of the principle of good faith. 
Complementary to the argument based upon moral and ethical 
standards, it has been argued that application of good faith demands a 
“holistic approach as it is a state of mind which is expected to preexist by all 
those interpreting the CISG.”14 However, unlike the task of applying CISG 
provisions which represent manifestations of the good faith principle (where 
certain CISG provision can lege artis be applied without defining the good 
faith principle itself),15 an attempt to define good faith for the purposes of 
Art. 7(1) must rest on more tangible criteria. 
As previously mentioned, in those jurisdictions that recognize the 
general principle of good faith, legislators employ the normative technique 
of an open-ended legal rule. Such an approach enables flexible application of 
the principle and opens the door for both jurisprudence and legal theory to 
substantiate its meaning in line with what is considered to be the appropriate 
standard of parties’ behavior within a particular legal system. The potential 
problem with applying such method in relation to Art. 7(1) of the CISG is 
rather obvious. The substantive meaning of the good faith principle in the 
CISG clearly cannot be settled by the judicial process, as there is no 
“supreme” international commercial court that would have the task of 
maintaining uniform jurisprudence on the CISG. At the same time, only 
superficial review of scholarly writings shows that there is virtually no 
agreement on (at least) the lowest common denominator regarding the 
substantive meaning of the good faith principle in the CISG. Suggestions, to 
name only a few, include propositions that “the function of such a general 
clause can probably be fulfilled by the rule that the parties must conduct 
themselves according to the standard of the ‘reasonable person,’”16 that good 
faith “is a way of acting, one which most people know but cannot put into 
                                                                                                                           
 
14 Bruno Zeller, Good Faith—The Scarlet Pimpernel of the CISG, 6 INT’L. TRADE & BUS. L. ANN. 
227, 238 (2000). 
15 Id. at 239–44 (analyzing application of the good faith principle in prescribed situations and by 
reference to Arts. 40, 49(2), 29(2), 38, and 39 of the CISG). 
16 PETER SCHLECHTRIEM, UNIFORM SALES LAW—THE UN-CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE 
INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS 38 (1986), https://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/schlechtriem-07 
.html. 
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words,”17 that “the obligation of good faith is the duty to act reasonably and 
to avoid a breach of the trusting relationship that exists between contracting 
parties,”18 all the way to the outright denial of the need to substantively define 
the good faith principle as such “definition does not help to advance the 
application of good faith.”19 
Returning to the argument that good faith is a preexisting state of mind 
(supposedly intuitively known to all those interpreting and applying the 
CISG) moves the argument dangerously close to domestic law 
preconceptions of those who interpret the CISG. As the preexisting notion of 
any legal concept is both formed and adopted as early as receiving a legal 
education within a specific legal system, probably the best way to illustrate 
pitfalls of relying on the interpreter’s state of mind is by quoting Atiyah: 
Nobody with any experience of legal teaching can doubt the power which legal 
concepts exercise over the minds of law students. Once a set of concepts falling 
into some overall pattern is grasped, the student often becomes incapable of seeing 
the physical facts themselves except through the conceptual process. Facts and 
events cease to be seen as physical occurrences and come to be seen as falling 
naturally into conceptual pigeon-holes . . . . The student learns to characterize and 
classify almost intuitively, and without conscious appreciation of the mental 
process involved; yet it is the initial act of classification which often determines 
the result of a case, while making it seem like the conclusion is deduced by 
inexorable logic from the facts.20 
Although it is quite clear that no one can totally “escape” the deeply seeded 
preconceptions of domestic law, it seems that the national judge facing the 
problem of interpretation of the CISG should be provided with at least 
minimum guidance as to how to address the problem of substantively 
defining a general principle such as good faith. Left to his own devices 
(especially if the principle is recognized in his own domestic legal system), 
an interpreter will literally have no other option but to, either consciously or 
                                                                                                                           
 
17 Paul J. Powers, Defining the Undefinable: Good Faith and the United Nations Convention on 
the Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 18 J.L. & COM. 333, 352 (1999). 
18 Id.; see also id. at 335 (proposing that the duty of good faith can be defined as an expectation 
and obligation to act honestly and fairly in the performance of one’s contractual duties). 
19 BRUNO ZELLER, FOUR-CORNERS—THE METHODOLOGY FOR INTERPRETATION AND 
APPLICATION OF THE UN CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS 
(2003), http://vuir.vu.edu.au/88/1/4corners.html. 
20 P.S. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 685 (Clarendon Press 2000) 
(1985). 
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subconsciously, reach for solutions he is familiar with. In terms of good faith, 
this means that he will substantiate the good faith principle by reference to 
values inherent in his own legal system as that will be the only frame of 
reference he was given, while at the same time employing techniques that 
can (again, depending on normative techniques recognized within domestic 
law) either expand or narrow the scope of application of the principle itself. 
There should be no doubt that an interpretation based upon (in)direct 
analogy with domestic law runs against Art. 7(1) of the CISG, specifically 
the need to uphold the international character of the CISG and its uniform 
application.21 This is not to say that the meaning of good faith cannot be 
similar (or even identical) to the one contained in the particular domestic law, 
but rather that the autonomous application of the CISG is ensured by the 
proper interpretative process. In other words, the starting point of 
interpretation must never focus on a similar and/or identical term, principle 
or rule contained in the national law. Quite to the contrary, to minimize the 
danger of potential analogy one must interpret a specific term in relation to 
other CISG provisions while intentionally avoiding drawing parallels with 
domestic law. Influence of domestic law should be tolerated only if it can be 
shown that the specific meaning pertaining to the domestic law is either 
recognized or established on a comparative and international level.22 Since 
there is (still) no workable uniform definition of the principle of good faith 
(either on a comparative or an international level), the process of defining it 
does not tolerate any domestic preconceptions. Our further analysis is thus 
based upon the premise that the wording of Art. 7(1) firmly places the 
intended meaning of good faith outside the reach of domestic law. 
III. OBSERVANCE OF GOOD FAITH IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 
Proper analysis of the good faith principle in the CISG must start by 
recognizing that wording of Art. 7(1) contains specific reference to the good 
faith in international trade. Consequently, before one tries to attribute 
meaning to the good faith principle itself, it is necessary to define what is 
meant by international trade. 
                                                                                                                           
 
21 See CISG: A COMMENTARY, supra note 2, at 117 (pointing out that “internationality and 
uniformity are functionally interrelated and interdependent”). 
22 Id. at 118. 
 
22 JOURNAL OF LAW AND COMMERCE [Vol. 38:11 
 
Vol. 38 (2019-2020) ● ISSN: 2164-7984 (online) ● ISSN 0733-2491 (print)  
DOI 10.5195/jlc.2020.172 ● http://jlc.law.pitt.edu 
The most obvious way to explain reference to international trade is to 
put an emphasis on the word international. Insistence on an international 
dimension is in line with the CISG’s general goal to eliminate legal obstacles 
by way of adopting autonomously defined rules governing contracts for the 
international sale of goods.23 However, it should be remembered that Art. 
7(1) of the CISG is a self-contained rule providing for three separate 
interpretative criteria: regard for the CISG’s international character, need to 
promote uniformity in its application, and observance of good faith in 
international trade. The requirement to interpret good faith in an autonomous 
manner is already embodied in the criterion relating to CISG’s international 
character. 
If Art. 7(1) of the CISG did not provide for reference to good faith in 
international trade (but merely that in the interpretation of the CISG regard 
is to be had to the observance of good faith), that would still mean that the 
term good faith had to be interpreted by having regard to CISG’s 
international character, i.e., in an autonomous manner and independent from 
preconceptions of domestic laws. It therefore follows that one should at least 
try to explore whether the reference to international trade in Art. 7(1) of the 
CISG attaches a qualitatively different meaning to the principle of good faith. 
Conclusion to the contrary would, at the very least, mean that Art. 7(1) refers 
to the same interpretative criterion twice (firstly, by stressing the need for an 
autonomous interpretation and then by repeating that the same interpretative 
method must be used in the process of defining and applying the good faith 
principle itself). Unless one is ready to conclude that explicit reference to 
international trade has no meaning at all (and should be disregarded every 
time the good faith criterion is applied), it seems appropriate to further 
                                                                                                                           
 
23 See INST. OF INT’L COMMERCIAL LAW OF THE PACE UNIV. SCHOOL OF LAW, supra note 3. Author 
describes the qualification of the term “international trade” in Art. 7(1) of the CISG by making four main 
points: (1) that the principle of good faith must not be determined by applying standards of domestic laws, 
(2) that the CISG specifically governs only commercial contracts, (3) that the CISG deals only with 
international commercial transactions, and (4) that indications are to be found by reference to the CISG’s 
Preamble. We believe that neither of these points are crucial for determination of the term “international 
trade” within Art. 7(1) of the CISG. Namely, point (1) is already covered by Art. 7(1) of the CISG, more 
specifically its reference to the requirement to interpret the CISG by having regard to its international 
character and points (2) and (3) are covered by the scope of the CISG’s application itself. As to point (4), 
it will be shown further in the text that references in the Preamble are of a generic nature and irrelevant 
for legal analysis of Art. 7(1) of the CISG. 
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examine the full wording of the third interpretative criterion—observance of 
good faith in international trade. 
A. Reference to International Trade in Art. 9(2) of the CISG 
Although reference to good faith is mentioned only once in the CISG, 
reference to international trade is mentioned three times in the preamble and 
in two separate provisions (Art. 7(1) and Art. 9(2) of the CISG). The 
Preamble uses the term international trade in a descriptive manner, denoting 
the exchange of goods and services across national borders as a tool for 
promoting “friendly relations among states”24 and that instituting uniform 
rules removes differences in national laws and sets the stage for further 
development of international trade.25 It follows that the references used in the 
Preamble are obviously of little help since they are of a generic nature and 
ultimately irrelevant for legal analysis of Art. 7(1) of the CISG. However, the 
wording of Art. 9(2) of the CISG is more precise as it provides that: 
The parties are considered, unless otherwise agreed, to have impliedly made 
applicable to their contract or its formation a usage of which the parties knew or 
ought to have known and which in international trade is widely known to, and 
regularly observed by, parties to contracts of the type involved in the particular 
trade concerned.26 
There are at least two (not mutually exclusive) ways in which one can 
approach the reference to international trade from Art. 9(2) of the CISG. The 
first (commonly put forward by legal theory) is placing emphasis on the word 
“international.” In this way, reference to international trade in Art. 9(2) of 
the CISG is used to characterize the concept of international (as opposed to 
purely domestic) trade usages. Once again, this must not to be confused with 
the need to interpret the term trade usage autonomously, i.e., by having 
regard to CISG’s international character as provided by Art. 7(1) of the 
CISG. The second approach assumes that the term international trade must 
                                                                                                                           
 
24 CISG, supra note 1, at pmbl. (“Considering that the development of international trade on the 
basis of equality and mutual benefit is an important element in promoting friendly relations among 
States[.]”). 
25 Id. (“Being of the opinion that the adoption of uniform rules which govern contracts for the 
international sale of goods and take into account the different social, economic and legal systems would 
contribute to the removal of legal barriers in international trade and promote the development of 
international trade[.]”). 
26 Id. art. 9(2). 
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be analyzed functionally and by taking into account the intended meaning of 
Art. 9(2) of the CISG. In other words, by providing that the usage must be 
“widely known in international trade and regularly observed by parties to 
contracts of the type involved in the particular trade concerned,” Art. 9(2) of 
the CISG puts an emphasis on the perception of subjects conducting business 
transactions in international trade. The term international trade is not an 
abstract notion used to denote that the CISG applies to international contracts 
of sale and/or commercial transactions. Quite to the contrary, it is used to 
demonstrate that a specific set of subjects participating in international trade 
have a sufficient level of observance of the usage. To put it bluntly, to be 
“widely known in international trade” simply means that an international 
trade usage must be perceived by the critical number of subjects participating 
in the international trade. Likewise, to be “regularly observed by parties to 
contracts of the type involved in the particular trade concerned” relates to the 
level of observance of parties conducting their sales transactions in a 
particular sector of international trade. In other words, an international trade 
usage will be deemed impliedly applicable to the sales contract only if it is 
recognized as such (i.e., widely known and regularly observed) by the those 
participating in international trade. 
At this point it is appropriate to point to the characteristic wording of 
Art. 9(2) of the CISG. Namely, unlike those CISG provisions where drafters 
were extra mindful to use the restrictive language (up to the point of 
deliberately leaving certain aspects of the provision open for subsequent 
interpretation), Art. 9(2) uses unusually broad language and seems to engage 
in unnecessary repetitions. 
First of all, it is interesting to note that the meaning of Art. 9(2) of the 
CISG would be the same even if the provision did not contain its last part, 
but rather only read “the parties are considered, unless otherwise agreed, to 
have impliedly made applicable to their contract or its formation a usage of 
which the parties knew or ought to have known and which in international 
trade is widely known to and regularly observed.” In other words, even 
without specifically mentioning “parties to contracts of the type involved in 
the particular trade concerned,” it would still follow that the requirement of 
knowledge and observance must be attributed to a critical number of subjects 
conducting their business transactions in the particular sector of international 
trade. An interpretation which would lead to a different conclusion would 
mean that Art. 9(2) of the CISG was intended to apply only to usages which 
are universally and globally recognized in literally all segments of 
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international trade, rendering (at least to our best knowledge) the provision 
effectively inapplicable. 
Secondly, there seems to be an intuitive problem with requirements 
relating to the need that the usage is “widely known” and “regularly 
observed” by parties conducting their transactions in international trade. 
Although one could engage in linguistic subtleties, it is hard to pinpoint a 
situation in which a usage will be widely known but somehow not regularly 
observed by the same set of targeted subjects. Moreover, if one were to 
indulge in an ultimate interpretation of Art. 9(2) of the CISG by means of 
teleological reduction, an argument could be made that even the requirements 
that the usage of international trade must be widely known and regularly 
observed are in itself superfluous. For example, if the provision only read 
that the parties are considered, unless otherwise agreed, to have impliedly 
made applicable to their contract or its formation a usage of international 
trade of which the parties knew or ought to have known,27 an autonomous 
interpretation of the term usage of international trade would still have to rely 
on prior determination of whether the subjects participating in international 
trade actually perceive and acknowledge usage as such. In other words, 
reference to international trade would (unless understood only generically 
and descriptively) be used as a synonym for subjects which are conducting 
their business transactions in international trade. The level of their perception 
would only be sufficient if the majority of traders engaging in certain sectors 
of international trade observed a usage on a widespread and regular basis. 
Since application of Art. 9(2) of the CISG is contingent on the 
perception of subjects participating in international trade, one can hardly 
ignore that the provision seems to imply the existence of a supranational set 
of international trade usages well observed by the business community. The 
first, and rather obvious, association, which comes naturally to those versed 
in the theory of international commercial law, is that Art. 9(2) of the CISG 
uses reference to international trade to ensure (implied) application of lex 
mercatoria to the sales contract. Deliberately bypassing the debate over the 
existence of the modern law merchant, we are using the term in (what we 
believe is) its least controversial meaning. Reference to international trade 
                                                                                                                           
 
27 See SCHLECHTRIEM & SCHWENZER, COMMENTARY ON THE UN CONVENTION ON THE 
INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS (CISG) 191 (Ingeborg Schwenzer ed., 3d ed. 2010) (requiring that 
parties “knew or ought to have known” of the usage is of minimal practical importance once the objective 
knowledge is determined). 
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in Art. 9(2) of the CISG is used to denote a set of mercantile customs and 
usages generated and recognized by subjects involved in international trade. 
Under the assumption that same terms should be attributed the same 
meaning within the CISG, our analysis further focuses on Art. 7(1) and the 
meaning of good faith in international trade. 
B. Reference to International Trade in Art. 7(1) of the CISG 
As already mentioned, reference to good faith from Art. 7(1) of the 
CISG should not be uncritically equated with the requirement to define good 
faith in line with the CISG’s international character, i.e., by using a method 
of autonomous interpretation. An analysis must take into account the full 
wording used in the provision and thus interpret the meaning of good faith in 
international trade. 
Drawing on the conclusions relating to Art. 9(2) of the CISG, it seems 
that the wording of Art. 7(1) and its specific reference to international trade 
suggests that the application of good faith as an interpretative criterion 
depends on the perceptions of subjects involved in international trade. In 
other words, it is irrelevant whether legal scholars, practitioners, comparative 
law experts and proponents of unification sales projects will ever achieve 
feasible consensus on the substantive meaning of the good faith principle. 
Quite to the contrary, its existence (and ultimately its meaning) depends on 
it being recognized by critical number of participants of international sales 
transactions within a particular trade sector. 
(In)direct confirmation of our conclusions can be found in Art. 1.7(1) of 
the International Institute for the Unification of Private Law’s (UNIDROIT) 
Principles of International Commercial Contracts (PICC), which provides 
that “each party must act in accordance with good faith and fair dealing in 
international trade.”28 Although this provision clearly has a different scope 
of application than Art. 7(1) of the CISG—as it stipulates general obligation 
of contractual parties to act in accordance with good faith29—it seems that 
                                                                                                                           
 
28 UNIDROIT, Principles of International Commerical Contracts art. 1.7(1) (Rome, 2016). 
29 See COMMENTARY ON THE UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL 
CONTRACTS (PICC) 19 (Stefan Vogenauer ed., 2d ed. 2015). Although Art. 1.7(1) of the PICC refers to 
good faith and fair dealing (and not only to good faith, as Art. 7(1) of the CISG), official commentary 
confirms that the combination of these two terms must be viewed from a merely linguistic perspective. 
More specifically, it was not used to distinguish the content of the principle from that contained in the 
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parallels concerning interpretation of the term good faith in international 
trade can nevertheless be drawn. At the very least, we found no authors who 
argue that the meaning of good faith in the CISG depends (and varies) 
according to its scope of application, nor can we conceive a viable argument 
that could be used to justify such different treatment of the principle. 
The meaning of good faith in international trade in Art. 1.7(1) of the 
PICC takes into account that it is enough for the standard to be recognized 
within a particular trade sector (dismissing the premise that its application 
depends on the existence of one single global standard of good faith for all 
international transactions).30 Furthermore, good faith is considered to be an 
objective standard which applies to everyone involved in a respective trade.31 
Although purely national standards are excluded, wording apparently leaves 
enough room for an argument that a standard is common and well accepted 
within a particular geographical region as the scope of the principle would 
otherwise be considerably (and arguably unacceptably) narrowed.32 
Turning back to Art. 7(1) of the CISG and the need to observe good faith 
in international trade, it follows that the precondition for application of good 
faith as an interpretative criterion is that it is, in fact, an existing and operative 
principle perceived, recognized, and acknowledged by the critical number of 
subjects participating in (a particular sector) of international trade. Once 
again, it is hard to avoid association with lex mercatoria. However, this time 
one at least has to consider the possibility that its meaning might be broader 
than a previously suggested set of mercantile customs and usages. Indeed, it 
has been pointed out in legal theory that one of the possible roles of good 
faith in the CISG may be based upon the notion that good faith is a trade 
usage.33 It was thus suggested that the strongest argument that can be 
advanced in that respect is that an obligation of good faith can be derived 
from new lex mercatoria.34 
                                                                                                                           
 
CISG or any other domestic law which (as is the situation in some civil law countries) uses the term good 
faith. As confirmed by both French and Italian versions of Art. 1.7(1) of the PICC (which refer to bonne 
foi and buona fede), the English version of the PICC opted to use a linguistic formula which was 
considered optimal for American, Canadian, and Australian lawyers. 
30 Id. at 213. 
31 Id. at 212. 
32 Id. (using this example under the presumption that both parties are located in that region). 
33 See Sim, supra note 9. 
34 Id. The author ultimately rejects this idea and concludes that it “would be unsafe to find an 
international obligation of good faith based on Article 9 of the CISG.” 
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It should hardly come as a surprise that the idea that the good faith 
principle forms part of lex mercatoria as one of its most basic principles was 
voiced by legal theory.35 However, although there is definitely no shortage 
of literature dealing with the concept of an omnipresent law merchant which 
apparently has its origins in the middle ages, even its most eager proponents 
will admit that the idea is still far from being universally accepted. Those 
more critical of the notion of a supranational set of international rules and 
principles (like the authors of this paper) will readily point out that lex 
mercatoria is not even recognized by the merchants themselves. Namely, if 
lex mercatoria indeed represents a self-contained uniform set of rules 
supposedly widely recognized by the business community, then its benefits 
would surely be recognized by that same business community in terms of 
their contracting practices. However, even the superficial analysis of arbitral 
awards (arbitration here being the preferred method of dispute settlement in 
international commercial practice) clearly shows that nothing could be 
further from the truth. International commercial contracts are not referring to 
lex mercatoria and the number of instances where arbitral tribunals chose to 
apply it (because parties did not choose applicable law) is practically 
negligible.36 
Substantive meaning of the good faith principle cannot be derived from 
lex mercatoria, as there is no universal international obligation to act in good 
faith, allegedly known and recognized by members of the business 
community. And even if comparative analysis of all legal systems in the 
world could somehow deduce the lowest common denominator of what 
constitutes good faith, such a result could not be considered as binding on 
account of invoking lex mercatoria. 
However, this still does not mean that the observance of good faith 
cannot be deduced by reference to international trade usages, as defined by 
                                                                                                                           
 
35 Id. 
36 The attempt to explain these underwhelming statistics must consider the perspective of both legal 
professionals and parties to the international commercial transaction. Lawyers will, as a rule, refrain from 
advising their clients to insert specific references to lex mercatoria into their contracts. The term is simply 
too vague and uncertain, which effectively prevents them from giving sound legal advice required in terms 
of both contract formation and execution. Parties to the international commercial contracts (especially 
those belonging to a specific sector or industry of international trade) are, again, as a rule, aware of the 
specific customs and usages applicable to their transaction. The reference to applicable national law does 
not run against what they recognize as a pre-established part of their contractual arrangement. 
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Art. 9(2) of the CISG. As previously explained, usage does not need to be 
globally recognized by all subjects engaged in international trade. It will 
suffice that it is recognized by the parties conducting their business 
transactions within a particular trade sector. Although theoretically 
conceivable, it is unlikely that trade usage will explicitly provide for 
observance of good faith. It is far more likely that existing trade usage (if 
interpreted properly) may indicate that certain types of behavior are required 
by the business community on account of the fact that it is tantamount to 
conduct in good faith.37 If such qualities can be attributed to an international 
trade usage, then the principle of good faith can be deduced and used as an 
interpretative criterion by virtue of Art. 7(1) of the CISG.38 
This leads to rather interesting side effects. Namely, if an obligation to 
act in good faith can be deduced from an international trade usage as defined 
by Art. 9(2) of the CISG, this means that parties, unless otherwise agreed, 
will be considered to have impliedly made it applicable to their contract or 
its formation. This would, in turn, mean that the good faith principle (or better 
to say, its specific emanation as reflected in the usage) will be directly applied 
to the conduct of contractual parties. Surely, this portion of our analysis will 
satisfy scholars advocating that the good faith principle applies directly to 
parties as a standard of behavior they must follow while performing under 
their contract. At the same time, an identical standard would be used as an 
interpretative criterion by reference to Art. 7(1) of the CISG, provided, of 
                                                                                                                           
 
37 See Sim, supra note 9. Although the author advocates against the process of determining good 
faith by reference to Art. 9(2) of the CISG, she does recognize the possibility that there might be a usage 
of good faith “peculiar to a particular region or a particular trade sector.” 
38 See SCHLECHTRIEM & SCHWENZER, supra note 27, at 128–29. The authors are stating that 
standards (arguably, standards of the good faith principle) 
may be reflected in Conventions or draft Conventions, in practices observed in certain trades, 
in usages not (yet) meeting the requirements of Article 9(2), in so-called International 
Principles of contract law, in widely used standard forms and trade terms, etc., although the 
respective rules will rarely bear a label “good faith standard” (but may refer this standard 
themselves). 
Although we generally agree that good faith may potentially be reflected in all of the sources enumerated 
by authors, we believe that the source itself is ultimately of lesser importance. What is important is that 
the good faith principle is (either expressly or impliedly) reflected in trade usage which is recognized as 
international by a critical number of subjects engaged in particular sectors of international trade. At the 
same time, it would be erroneous to select one (or more) of the enumerated sources and/or instruments 
and uncritically recognize it as “compendium of international trade usages.” International trade usage, 
which potentially reflects good faith, can be found to exist only if subjects engaged in international 
business transactions recognize and acknowledge both its existence and substance. 
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course, that the relevant CISG provision needs additional clarification by 
courts and/or tribunals which are applying them. 
For the completeness of our analysis, it should also be noted that legal 
theory has put forward an argument that usages, on account of them being 
reasonable by nature, always promote the observance of good faith in 
international trade.39 Although we can generally support this view, it is 
important not to forget that the principle of good faith is essentially a standard 
of parties’ behavior. This means that the purpose of the analysis we are 
proposing is not to declaratorily identify that the good faith principle is 
reflected in an international trade usage. Its purpose is to substantiate the 
meaning of the good faith principle by identifying a specific standard of 
parties’ behavior which is considered appropriate in the particular sector of 
international trade. Once (and if) such a standard is identified, this can then 
be used as a supplementary interpretative criterion by virtue of Art. 7(1) of 
the CISG. 
Finally, it must also be noted that our line of reasoning could be put to 
the test by an argument that the interpretative process envisaged by Art. 7(1) 
of the CISG is not a factual one, but rather a normative one. It has indeed 
been argued that good faith in the CISG must be understood normatively, as 
it is not to be determined by the action of trading but by the adjudication of 
disputes that arise out of trade transactions.40 The contrary, and arguably 
unacceptable view, was said to confuse trade usages and good faith.41 
An argument that an interpretative process should have normative 
function fundamentally rests on the premise that an interpreter must apply 
good faith by reference to conduct that ought to be observed in international 
trade rather than extrapolating the principle from the conduct which is 
observed in international trade. In this respect, we stand by our previous 
conclusion that the present wording of Art. 7(1) of the CISG should not be 
viewed as a success, but rather as an unfortunate compromise. Drafters not 
only used the principle of good faith (i.e., a standard of parties’ behavior) and 
elevated it to the level of an interpretative criterion, but also further qualified 
                                                                                                                           
 
39 See Patrick X. Bout, Trade Usages: Article 9 of the Convention on Contracts for the International 
Sale of Goods (1998), https://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/bout.html#N_1_. 
40 See ULI FOERSTL, THE GENERAL PRINCIPLE OF GOOD FAITH UNDER THE UNITED NATIONS 
CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS (CISG)—A FUNCTIONAL 
APPROACH TO THEORY AND PRACTICE 43 (2005), https://open.uct.ac.za/bitstream/handle/11427/4611/ 
thesis_law_uli_foerstl_2005.pdf?sequence=1. 
41 Id. 
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its meaning by adding reference to international trade. As previously 
mentioned, unless one is ready to conclude that reference to international 
trade has no meaning at all (or alternatively, that its purpose is to simply 
reiterate what is already clearly stated in other CISG provisions), it seems 
that the drafters (un)intentionally moved the concept of good faith away from 
the classic meaning it traditionally has in those domestic laws that recognize 
it as general principle of law. Good faith is still an objective concept, as an 
interpreter must consider what is perceived as the recognized standard of 
conduct by the subjects engaged in international trade. Although subjective 
state of mind of the contractual parties (much like the interpreter’s own 
subjective view on this issue) will still be irrelevant, the process of 
determining good faith in international trade will indeed have more of a 
descriptive (i.e., factual) rather than normative role. In other words, a central 
factor of the interpretative process will be to determine what conduct is 
considered adequate and appropriate (or, if one prefers, reasonable) among 
international tradesmen.42 If the factual background of such an investigation 
is neglected, the interpreter will have nothing but an option to rely on its own 
perceived notion of what conduct is tantamount to good faith in international 
trade. Although that is certainly an option, it seems that a previous factual 
investigation should not be a priori viewed as damaging for the interpretative 
process. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
There is little doubt that Art. 7 of the CISG is one of the most important 
provisions of the CISG. The fact that it is still highly disputed is thus not only 
unfortunate but potentially detrimental for the overall application of the 
CISG. It seems that Art. 7(1) of the CISG, and especially its part relating to 
the requirement to interpret the CISG by observance of good faith in 
international trade, is one of the fundamental factors contributing to the 
overall controversy. However, to conclude that the problem exclusively lies 
in the alleged ambiguity of the term good faith (as could be inferred from the 
abundance of scholarly writings on the topic) would be an oversimplification 
of the issue. After all, if that is indeed perceived as a crucial problem, then 
                                                                                                                           
 
42 In this sense, see also Felemegas (ed.), loc. cit. n.2, text accompanying footnote 483. Although 
author also opts for a descriptive rather than normative value of the interpretative criterion, he makes no 
proposition that good faith should be determined in relation to Art. 9(2) of the CISG. 
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even the biggest enthusiasts will most likely admit that the search for an all-
inclusive, independent, universally applicable and autonomous definition of 
the principle of good faith in international trade will continue at a 
frustratingly slow pace. To patiently wait for a world-wide recognition of lex 
mercatoria (or some other uncertain and mystical supranational authority 
which will arguably be regarded as the ultimate source of the principle of 
good faith in international trade), although certainly an option, hardly 
represents a satisfactory solution for courts, arbitrators, and, most 
importantly, parties to international sales transactions. 
Our analysis shows that one of the main problems pertaining to Art. 7(1) 
of the CISG is not so much the notorious elusiveness of the term good faith, 
but rather the absence of an agreement on a workable frame of reference 
against which the substantive meaning of the principle can be measured. 
Fully acknowledging that the good faith principle at its very core represents 
a standard of parties’ behavior may be a helpful first step in finding a 
workable solution within the CISG. A second step would be to recognize the 
full wording of the respective part of Art. 7(1) of the CISG, i.e., good faith 
in international trade. The purpose of the reference to international trade is 
not to promote the need for an autonomous interpretation of the good faith 
principle within the CISG, as this is obviously mandated by the requirement 
to interpret the CISG by having regard to its international character. 
Likewise, its purpose is not to emphasize that the CISG applies only to 
international commercial transactions, as that follows from the CISG’s scope 
of application. A proposed functional approach reveals that the purpose of 
the reference is to consider subjects conducting their transactions in 
international trade. Such an approach is complementary to the fundamental 
purpose of the general principle of good faith itself, which is to ensure that 
parties to a transaction are discharging of their rights and obligations in a 
manner which is considered appropriate within a given legal framework. It is 
within these boundaries that the national judge (with the help of legal theory) 
will substantiate the meaning of the principle of good faith. However, when 
the given legal framework is the CISG, what constitutes such a standard of 
behavior must be answered by the subjects participating in international trade 
themselves. Criteria for such determination should focus on whether a critical 
number of subjects which participate in international trade perceive and 
recognize certain conduct as an appropriate standard of conduct in the 
respective trade. To draw parallels with international trade usages from Art. 
9(2) of the CISG is an obvious and, in our opinion, welcoming next step. In 
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addition, as there is no international commercial court able to authoritatively 
settle the issue of what constitutes good faith for the purposes of the CISG, 
and legal theory is far from reaching viable consensus, a proposed solution 
could provide the interpreter (national judge or arbitrator) with a precise 
enough frame of reference that can be employed in the process of 
determining what conduct is considered tantamount to acting in good faith in 
international trade. 
Finally, we would certainly propose that an interpretative criterion of 
observance of good faith in international trade is used restrictively and with 
utmost caution. Its application must be done by keeping in mind that the 
drafters essentially used a standard of behavior (against which one must, by 
very definition, measure the conduct of contractual parties) and assigned it a 
role in the process of CISG interpretation. However, this does not mean that 
the good faith principle lost its basic characteristics of being an appropriate 
standard of parties’ behavior. Good faith is not, in itself, a supreme value 
sought after by legal theory and practice in their search for just and equitable 
solutions. After all, if that were the case, one could (rather cynically) argue 
that the drafters of the CISG, in their search for optimal compromise 
solutions, were surely always mindful of the underlying values of good faith. 
In other words, the function of the good faith principle is simply not to serve 
as a criterion for evaluation of perceived ambiguities of legal provisions. It 
is rather a straightforward principle which mandates that parties to a 
transaction are performing their contractual rights and obligations in a 
manner considered appropriate by the specific legal system (or, in the case 
of the CISG, in a manner considered appropriate by subjects involved in 
international trade transactions). By placing it in Art. 7(1) of the CISG, i.e., 
in the provision on interpretation, drafters certainly did not help future 
interpreters. As previously mentioned, if there is but one conclusion that can 
be drawn with certainty from our analysis, it is that the process of 
interpretation which relies on observance of good faith in international trade 
will not come naturally to judges and/or arbitrators coming from either civil 
or common law countries. If the proposed solution seems artificial, circular, 
or (at least in some instances) inconsequential, such a result must be primarily 
attributed to the fact that Art. 7(1) of the CISG mandates that the standard of 
parties’ behavior is used as an interpretative criterion. An alternative, at least 
in our opinion, would be to conclude that the requirement of an observance 
of good faith in international trade from Art. 7(1) of the CISG should be 
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disregarded in an interpretation process entirely on account of it being 
functionally inoperable. 
